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I. INTRODUCTION
The Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine
Environmental Protection estimates that approximately 450,000 tons
of oil are intentionally jettisoned from ships into the world’s oceans
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and seas each year. 1 Forty-five years ago, recognizing that such
intentional discharges as well as accidental releases from ships of
crude and refined oil and other petroleum derivatives into the world’s
oceans and seas had become an increasingly significant source of
environmental pollution, the United Nations International Maritime
Organization (“IMO”), a specialized agency of the United Nations
responsible for regulating international shipping, promulgated the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(“MARPOL 73”). 2 Five years later, the IMO adopted the Protocol of
1978 to supplement MARPOL 73 (“MARPOL 78” and, collectively
with MARPOL 73, “MARPOL 73/78”). 3 MARPOL 73/78, which
took effect on October 2, 1983, aims “to achieve the complete
elimination of intentional pollution of the marine environment by oil
and other harmful substances and the minimization of accidental
discharge of such substances.” 4 Annex I of MARPOL 73/78
specifically governs pollution by oil, defined broadly as “petroleum in
any form including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse and refined
products” as well as oil-contaminated wastewater released from
covered ships. 5
In spite of MARPOL 73/78 and statutes enacted by signatory
states to implement it, such as the US Act for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (“APPS”), accidental and deliberate marine oil
pollution continues to occur at staggering rates. According to data
compiled by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
1. GESAMP, JOINT GROUP OF EXPERTS ON THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF MARINE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, REPORT AND STUDIES NO. 75: ESTIMATES OF OIL ENTERING
THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT FROM SEA-BASED ACTIVITIES 15, 60 (2007); David P. Kehoe,
United States v. Abrogar: Did the Third Circuit Miss the Boat, 39 LEWIS & CLARK ENV. L.
REV. 1, 42 (2009).
2. “MARPOL” is a portmanteaux of “marine” and “pollution.” International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 (entered into
force Oct. 2, 1983) [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78].
3. Id.
4. Id. annex I.
5. Although the definition of “oil” is broad, it is not unlimited. In United States v. Apex
Oil Co., 132 F.3d 1287, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), the United States brought charges against Apex
Oil Co. alleging that Apex’s employees had “knowingly and willfully conspire[d] and agree[d]
to discharge cargo-related oil residues,” including tools used to clean petroleum storage as well
as oil residues collected from their vessel’s holds during vessel cleaning operations. Id. at
1288-89. The Ninth Circuit, invoking the rule of lenity, held that cargo-related oil residues did
not fit within the meaning of “oil” regulated by MARPOL 73/78. Id. at 1291. For a discussion
of vessels covered by MARPOL 73/78, see infra Part II(B).
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(“NOAA”), between January 1, 2000 and April 10, 2019, more than
594,678,219 gallons of liquid hydrocarbons, including both crude and
refined oil, were discharged intentionally or unintentionally from
ships and offshore drilling rigs into US coastal waters, which extend
only twelve miles from the nation’s shorelines. 6 The environmental
harm caused to marine ecosystems and coastal environments and
economies by maritime oil discharges is unquantifiable because of its
enormity.
Mishaps involving oil tankers and offshore drilling platforms,
such as the grounding of the Exxon Valdez in 1989 and the blowout of
the Deepwater Horizon in 2010, often result in the emission of
millions of gallons of oil over a short-period of time and thus attract a
great deal of media attention. 7 Deliberate discharges of oil from cargo
ships, tankers, cruise ships, fishing boats, and other marine vessels, in
contrast, are smaller in scale, and therefore, more difficult to detect
and trace to a specific source. Ships’ crews regularly jettison oilcontaminated wastewater surreptitiously, often under cover of
darkness, in contravention of applicable treaties, laws, and regulations
to save ship owners and operators the expense and inconvenience of
lawful disposal. 8 These illegal oil discharges cumulatively cause more

6. IncidentNews, Raw Incident Data, https://incidentnews.noaa.gov/raw/index
[https://perma.cc/3HMM-LSMD]. This statistic was derived from NOAA’s raw incident data.
Spills of oil into the waters of the United States were separated from spills of other chemicals.
Using Microsoft Excel, a sum of the “maximum potential release” of oil in each incident since
the year 2000 was calculated therefrom. The United Nations Environment Programme
estimates that approximately 13,000,000 gallons of oil are illegally jettisoned into the
Mediterranean Sea annually. Environmental Alert Bulletin, UNEP, Stéphane Kluser, Illegal
Oil Discharge in European Seas (2006).
7. Substantial marine oil spills are staggeringly expensive to remediate. In the aftermath
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Exxon paid approximately US$1 billion to clean up the oil it had
released into the Prince William Sound in Alaska and over US$500 million to compensate
Alaskan Natives, landowners, and commercial fishermen for the damage caused by the spill.
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476 (2008). During the litigation following the
spill, the United States Supreme Court vacated the initial punitive damages award of US$2.5
billion against Exxon and limited Exxon’s punitive damages to approximately US$500
million, holding that maritime punitive damages should not exceed the compensatory
damages. Id. at 498. Exxon incurred costs of approximately US$2 billion in civil fines and
remediation costs as a result of the 1989 spill. See Jonathan L. Ramseur, Oil Spills Background
and Governance, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33705.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ3H-Z8CR]
(last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
8. Ben Vollaard, Temporal displacement of environmental crime. Evidence from marine
oil pollution 1, 3 (Apr. 2016) (unpublished manuscript).
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ocean and sea pollution than large-scale oil releases resulting from
marine accidents. 9
Intentional releases of oil, except in emergency situations when
necessary to save lives or vessels or during times of war, are
prohibited by MARPOL 73/78 and, therefore, by APPS. 10 However,
due to jurisdictional restrictions, the US government has not been able
to directly prosecute most deliberate oil discharges. 11 Under the “law
of the flag,” unlawful actions taken by foreign-flagged vessels on the
high seas 12 are outside the reach of US jurisdiction and are only
subject to redress by the nations in which these vessels are
registered. 13 If the flag flown by the MARPOL 73/78 violator is a
“flag of convenience,” it is highly unlikely that any criminal charges
will ever be filed against its owner, operator, master, engineer, or
crewmembers for unlawful oil discharges into international waters. 14
Because APPS contains a savings clause, which provides that
APPS does not “limit, deny, amend, modify, or repeal any other
remedy available to the United States,” 15 the United States, acting
through the Department of Justice; the Coast Guard; the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the governmental department in which the Coast
Guard is located; and the Administrator of the EPA, have resorted to
making indictments related to illegal discharges of oil on the high
seas by foreign-flagged ships entering the territorial waters of the
United States based on actions taken by the vessel’s owner, operator,
master, engineer, and crewmembers individually and collectively to
9. Id.
10. See 33 U.S.C. § 1902(b)(2)(B).
11. See Nicholas H. Berg, Bringing It All Back Home: The Fifth and Second Circuit
Allow Domestic Prosecutions for Oil Record Book Violations on Foreign-Flagged Vessels, 34
TUL. MAR. L.J. 253, 256 (2009); see also Andrew Homer, Red Sky at Morning: The Horizon
for Corporations, Crew Members, and Corporate Officers as the United States Continues
Aggressive Criminal Prosecution of Intentional Pollution from Ships, 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 149,
156 (2007).
12. Black’s law dictionary defines “high seas” as the “seas outside the territorial waters
that are open to all states.” High seas, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). See
generally Statement on United States Ocean Policy 1 PUB. PAPERS 378-79 (Mar. 10, 1983).
13. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
14. Homer, supra note 11, at 154. See also Shaun Gehan, United States v. Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.: Use of Federal “False Statements Act” to Extend Jurisdiction Over
Polluting Incidents into Territorial Seas of Foreign States, 7 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 167, 182
(2001).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1907(f).
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cover-up their Annex I violations. 16 Prosecutors in the United States
have been able to obtain convictions of Annex I violators, as well as
sanctions including fines and incarceration, by charging them with
offenses under various federal statutes relating to their cover-ups of
the unlawful discharges by falsifying oil discharge records, lying to
government officials, obstructing justice or agency proceedings, and
conspiracy. 17 In the past two decades, the US Department of Justice
has levied an aggregate of almost US$500 million in criminal
penalties against approximately 140 companies that own or operate
marine vessels. 18 The fines and prison sentences handed down for
violations of MARPOL 73/78 have not proven to be punitive enough
to serve as an effective deterrent against illegal oil releases. 19 Sections
2Q1.3 of the US Sentencing Guidelines governs sentencing for
violations of APPS. 20 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that this section does not allow sentences to be “enhance[d],”
increasing fines or prison time, based upon violations of Annex I of
MARPOL 73/78 by foreign-flagged vessels that occur in international
waters. 21
This Note explains why and how, although MARPOL 73/78 and
the APPS create a comprehensive system for prohibiting deliberate
releases of oil into marine environments, the law of the flag thwarts
the ability of the US government to combat effectively intentional oil
pollution from seafaring vessels. Part II describes the quantity of oil
jettisoned by ships into the world’s oceans and seas and the
detrimental effects oil causes to marine environments. Part III sets
forth the parameters of MARPOL 73/78’s prohibition against
intentional oil releases as well as its requirements for the installation
and use of oil pollution control equipment on covered vessels. Part IV
explores the incentives for ship owners, operators, masters, engineers,
and crewmembers to illegally jettison oil and common methods for
doing so. Part V turns to the jurisdictional limitations that the law of
the flag imposes on MARPOL 73/78’s enforcement. Specifically,
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1901(a)(11); 33 U.S.C. § 1901(a)(1); Berg, supra note 11, at 256.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Royal Caribbean, 24 F. Supp. 2d. 155, 158 (D.P.R. 1997).
18. Erica E. Phillips, U.S. Fines Cargo Ship Operator $1 Million for Polluting Waters,
WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-fines-cargo-ship-operator-1million-for-polluting-waters-1526056342 [https://perma.cc/7U9Q-UBUG].
19. See id.
20. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
21. United States v. Abrogar, 459 F.3d 430, 434 (3d Cir. 2006).
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even though MARPOL 73/78 signatories, including the United States,
may prosecute intentional oil releases that occur within their
territorial waters, only flag states have jurisdiction to prosecute
offenses occurring on the high seas. Ship owners, operators, masters,
engineers, and crewmembers are aware of this jurisdictional
impediment to MARPOL 73/78’s enforcement and, therefore, if they
are inclined to unlawfully jettison oil, they tend to do so in
international waters. Part VI examines various US criminal statutes to
which US prosecutors have turned in order to prosecute efforts by
ship owners, operators, masters, engineers, and crewmembers to
conceal their MARPOL 73/78 violations. Part VII describes features
in the US Sentencing Guidelines that limit the criminal penalties that
US courts can impose for the commission of cover-up crimes related
to the illegal discharge of oil. Part VIII describes four recent
prosecutions relating to the illegal jettisoning of oil to illustrate the
nature and extent of ongoing MARPOL 73/78 violations. Part VIII
then offers several recommendations for promoting MARPOL 73/78
compliance and deterring non-compliance. Going forward,
compliance with Annex I should be made less expensive for ship
owners and operators and less burdensome for ship masters,
engineers, and crews. Additionally, the United States should seek to
expand its jurisdiction over unlawful oil releases by foreign-flagged
vessels and extend coverage of Annex I to smaller vessels. Vessels
and, in some instances, entire fleets, owned by violators of Annex I
should be banned from US ports. Finally, § 2Q1.3 of the US
Sentencing Guidelines should be amended to make clear that the
release of oil outside of the territorial waters of the United States may
be considered for purposes of enhancement during sentencing. The
definition of “environmental offense” should also be broadened to
include any violation of MARPOL 73/78 wherever in the world it
may take place.
II. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF OIL POLLUTION FROM
SHIPS
It is estimated that ten billion tons of raw materials and finished
goods are transported across the world’s oceans and seas by ship each
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year. 22 Maritime shipping is the most cost-effective way to move
large quantities of raw materials and finished goods. 23 As of 2018,
there were approximately 800,000 dry bulk carriers, 560,000 oil
tankers, 250,000 container ships, and 6,000 ferry and passenger ships
registered worldwide. 24 Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands
have the highest number of marine-vessel registrants. 25 All three of
these nations are deemed to issue flags of convenience.
Cruise Market Watch reports that the three largest cruise ship
operators, Carnival Cruise Line, Norwegian Cruise Line, and Royal
Caribbean Ltd., through subsidiaries, own 314 cruise ships. 26 Fifty
more cruise ships are “on order” for construction between 2018 and
2025. 27 The 2018 State of the Cruise Industry report estimates that in
2018 over twenty-seven million individuals worldwide traveled on
cruise ships. 28 Additionally, the world’s seas and oceans are used by
commercial fishing boats. The US Coast Guard reported in 2017 that
there were approximately twelve million recreational vessels
registered within the United States. 29 Some, but not all, of these
vessels are ocean-going.
A. Intentional Releases of Oil from Ships
Seafaring vessels generate oil-contaminated waste during their
normal operations. There are two categories of oil-contaminated
waste produced during a ship’s operations: sludge oil and lubrication
22. Tony R. Walker, Environmental Effects of Marine Transportation, in 3 WORLD
SEAS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION 505, 505 (Charles Sheppard ed., 2018).
23. Id.
24. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2018, at
24, UNCTAD/RMT/2018 (2018), available at https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
rmt2018_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/L87Z-UD2Z].
25. Jan Hoffmann, The World Maritime Fleet in 2017, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE &
DEV. (July 10, 2017), https://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1516
[https://perma.cc/KFR2-6F4A].
26. 2018 Worldwide Cruise Line Passenger Capacity, CRUISE MKT. WATCH,
https://cruisemarketwatch.com/capacity/ [https://perma.cc/4VS7-R2VV] (last visited Apr. 19,
2019).
27. Florida-Caribbean Cruise Ass’n, 2018 Cruise Industry Overview, FLORIDACARIBBEAN CRUISE ASS’N 2 (2018), https://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2018-Cruise-IndustryOverview-and-Statistics.pdf [https://perma.cc/RY2G-5SF8].
28. Id.
29. U.S. Coast Guard, 2016 Recreational Boating Statistics, U.S. COAST GUARD
BOATING (2017) https://www.uscgboating.org/library/accident-statistics/Recreational-BoatingStatistics-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8RK-UGSR].
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oil. 30 Sludge oil forms when oil emitted during the operation of the
vessel’s engine equipment drips to the bottom of the vessel where it
mixes with water, detergents, solvents, and other engine operational
byproducts that have accumulated in the bilge, the lowest point of a
vessel’s inner hull. 31 This mixture of water and sludge oil is often
referred to as “bilge oil.” 32 Bilge oil remains in a ship’s bilge until it
is removed. 33 Spent lubricating oil, which had been used to lubricate a
vessel’s equipment and machinery, is held in tanks where it may be
incinerated in compliance with international regulations or where it
may be stored for proper disposal at port reception facilities.34
Although technology exists to prevent untreated oil or oilcontaminated wastewater from being discharged from ships, this
technology can be, and often is, intentionally bypassed so that
untreated oil-contaminated wastewater is discharged into the world’s
oceans and seas where the oil has harmful effects on the marine
environment. 35
B. The Environmental Effects of Releasing Oil into Oceans and Seas
The marine shipping industry causes various types of
environmental pollution. 36 Ships emit greenhouse gases and discharge
blackwater, greywater, and ballast water, as well as oil into the
world’s oceans and seas. 37 Blackwater is water contaminated with
sewage and greywater is water “that has been slightly used,”

30. Kehoe, supra note 1, at 5.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Jho, 465 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626 (2006); Kehoe, supra note 1,
at 5; see also Bilge, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
bilge?show=0&t=1315360637 [https://perma.cc/3EA8-3VQ7] (last visited May 5, 2019).
32. Jho, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
33. Kehoe, supra note 1, at 5.
34. For purposes of this Note, discussions of illegal releases of “oil” refer collectively to
the illegal dumping of both sludge and lubricating oil. Kehoe, supra note 1, at 5-6.
35. Jho, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 627. See infra Part II.B. for a discussion of the equipment
that is commonly bypassed to permit untreated oil-contaminated wastewater to enter the
world’s oceans and seas.
36. Vollaard, supra note 8, at 2-4.
37. Marine shipping emits conventional air pollutants, such as sulfur oxides (SOx),
nitrogen oxides (NOx), volatile organic compounds, carbon monoxide (CO), and black carbon.
In 2012, the marine shipping industry emitted approximately one billion tons of CO2. Vollaard,
supra note 8, at 2-4, 7, 10, 12.
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including water from kitchens and laundry. 38 Ballast is used to
stabilize a ship, often in order to compensate for changes in the
weight or location of a ship’s cargo. 39 Ballasting and de-ballasting
occur when water or weighted materials are added to or removed
from oil storage tanks to keep a vessel stable. 40 Ships also
accidentally or intentionally release oil, dry bulk cargo (such as coal
or iron), and other hazardous noxious substances into marine
environments. 41
Oil pollution is of specific concern because it has destructive
impacts on marine ecosystems and marine mammals and other
aquatic life as well as on the residents of shoreline communities and
because it is so difficult to remediate. 42 When oil is discharged into
oceans or seas, it undergoes physical, chemical, and biological
weathering. 43 Volatile chemical compounds evaporate into the
atmosphere and other organic compounds are catalyzed in
photochemical reactions. 44 Bacteria may degrade certain chemical
components of oil. 45 The rate of weathering depends on the chemical
structure of the oil, water temperature, and the rate of mixing by
currents, wind, and waves. 46 Calm weather conditions prevent the oil
from mixing throughout the water column, allowing the oil to spread
along the surface water, contaminating shorelines. 47 Aggressive wave
action mixes and distributes the oil throughout the water column.
Medium-grade oils, such as gasoline, disperse farther than dense,
heavy-grade oils, which sink through the water column and are
deposited into the sediment where they may persist for years to
decades, depending on the environment. 48 Oil-coated sediments are
dispersed and break up more quickly in regions where there are high38. See Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. EPA, No. C 03-05760 SI, 2006 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 69476, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2006).
39. See Evergreen Am. Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.3d 827, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
40. Paul S. Dempsey, Compliance and Enforcement in International Law – Oil Pollution
of the Marine Environment by Ocean Vessels, 6 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 459, 465 (1984).
41. Vollaard, supra note 8, at 6-7.
42. See Oil in the Ocean, WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTION (July 28, 2014),
http://www.whoi.edu/oil/deepwater-horizon/faqs [https://perma.cc/B7CW-3F9M].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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energy currents. 49 Oil slicks on the ocean surface, which are usually
caused by medium-grade oil, pose the greatest threat to seabirds and
marine mammals. 50
Seabirds are particularly susceptible to oil pollution because they
pass through oil slicks when they dive into the water to forage for
food. 51 The oil absorbs into their feathers interfering with the
feathers’ natural “insulating” and “waterproofing” qualities. 52 The
seabirds must therefore exert a great deal of energy to stay warm, and
often die of hypothermia or exhaustion after coming into contact with
oil-contaminated water. 53 The same is true of marine mammals
because their fur loses its insulating properties when coated with oil.54
The ingestion of oil has been linked to a thinning of seabird eggs. 55
Although seabirds are so vulnerable to oil pollution and
contamination, it is difficult to estimate the exact number of seabird
casualties resulting from oil pollution because so many seabirds die
on the high seas and their corpses are never discovered. It is estimated
that for each dead, oil-covered sea bird discovered following a largescale oil spill, there may be up to ten seabirds that died at sea as a
result of the oil spill but whose bodies were never found. 56
Three methods are most often used to clean up large quantities
of oil that are intentionally and unintentionally discharged into marine
environments: burning, mechanical cleanup, and chemical
dispersants. 57 If oil is going to be burned, the burning operation must
be conducted slowly, and only small amounts of oil are ignited at any
time to lower the risk of an explosion. 58 The US Coast Guard’s OnScene Coordinator arranges and conducts oil spill cleanup efforts. 59
Booms are used to pull oil to a safe distance away from any ships so

49. Id.
50. Walker, supra note 22, at 8.
51. Walker, supra note 22, at 8.
52. Walker, supra note 22, at 8.
53. Walker, supra note 22, at 7.
54. Walker, supra note 22, at 7.
55. Walker, supra note 22, at 7.
56. Walker, supra note 22, at 7.
57. Exxon Valdez Spill Profile, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/emergency-response/exxon-valdez-spill-profile [https://perma.cc/6TU4BPAX] (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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that shipboard oil will not be accidentally ignited. 60 Burning
operations are weather-dependent and cannot be conducted
effectively in the rain. 61 If burning is not a feasible means of cleaning
up the oil contamination, booms and skimmers may be used to try to
isolate and mechanically skim and remove oil from the surface of the
water. 62 If the oil discharged into the ocean is heavy-grade, it will
clog the skimmers, which are expensive and time-consuming to clean
and replace. 63 Finally, the EPA specialists may coordinate the use of
chemical dispersants and bioremediation techniques to break down
discharged oil. 64 Chemical dispersants dissolve oil slicks, allowing
the oil to mix with water and to degrade more quickly; however,
chemical dispersants cannot always be used because the dispersants
themselves can damage marine environments. 65
III. MARITIME OIL POLLUTION TREATIES AND LEGISLATION
In 1851, Congress enacted the Limitation of Liability Act, 66
which capped the liability of the owner of a vessel at the post-casualty
value of the vessel plus pending freight so long as the casualty
occurred “without the privity or knowledge of the owner.” 67 The
possibility of exploitation of the Limitation of Liability Act became
apparent in the late 1960s, following the Torrey Canyon oil spill. In
1967, the Torrey Canyon, an oil tanker owned by a Californiaheadquartered corporation, but which flew the flag of Liberia, left
Kuwait with a cargo filled with crude oil. 68 The Torrey Canyon was
bound for Wales. 69 In March 1967, due to a navigational error, the
Torrey Canyon struck and became impaled on a rock near the Cornish
shore. 70 The Torrey Canyon discharged approximately 120,000 tons
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq.
67. 46 U.S.C. § 30501(b).
68. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Jeffrey D.
Morgan, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 5 FORDHAM ENV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).
69. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. at 229.
70. Bethan Bell and Mario Cacciottolo, Torrey Canyon oil spill: The day the sea turned
black, BBC (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-39223308.
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of crude oil into the English Channel and contaminated approximately
fifty miles of French coastline and 120 miles of Cornish coastline.71
The effects of the spill also killed at least 15,000 sea birds. 72 The
British Royal Air Force sent bombers to sink the stranded ship, but
not until after the Torrey Canyon had already released its oil cargo
into the sea. 73
The Torrey Canyon spill was the largest oil spill in the world at
that time. It cost approximately US$8 million (nearly US$60 million
adjusted for inflation) to clean up the pollution caused by the spill.74
The Torrey Canyon’s liability for the oil cleanup costs, however, was
limited to US$50 (approximately US$375 in 2019, adjusted for
inflation). 75 Because the Torrey Canyon was scuttled, the main vessel
itself was rendered valueless. 76 The Southern District of New York
therefore estimated the Torrey Canyon’s post-casualty value at merely
US$50, the approximate value of the single surviving lifeboat. 77
A. MARPOL 73/78
The Torrey Canyon oil spill exposed deficiencies in existing
international treaties and national laws to protect marine
environments from oil pollution. Accordingly, in 1973, the IMO
convened and drafted MARPOL 73. 78 Before MARPOL 73 went into
effect, the IMO modified MARPOL 73 with MARPOL 78. 79
MARPOL 73/78 was not self-executing and did not become law in its
signatory states until it had been implemented through domestic
legislation. 80

71. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. at 229. See also Adam Vaughan, Torrey
Canyon disaster – the UK's worst-ever oil spill 50 years on, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/mar/18/torrey-canyon-disaster-uk-worstever-oil-spill-50tha-anniversary [https://perma.cc/4DMY-L73L].
72. Bell, supra note 70.
73. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. at 229.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 230; The Inflation Calculator, WESTEGG, https://westegg.com/inflation/
[https://perma.cc/TVR2-X9BX] (last visited May 5, 2019).
76. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. at 232.
77. Id. at 230.
78. See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 2.
79. See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 2.
80. See Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1367 (S.D.
Fla. 1998).
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B. The US Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships
The United States’ enactment of MARPOL 73/78 is APPS,
which was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter in 1980. 81 The
EPA works in consultation with the Coast Guard to promulgate and
enforce regulations pursuant to APPS. 82 The Coast Guard patrols the
US coastline looking for evidence of oil discharged by marine vessels
using airplanes that are equipped with “Forward Looking Infrared
Radar capable of detecting oil spills even at night.” 83 Furthermore, the
Coast Guard utilizes technology that can “fingerprint match” samples
of oil released into the marine environment with samples collected
from a ship’s engine room. 84
APPS applies to “a ship of United States registry or nationality,
or one operated under the authority of the United States, wherever
located.” 85 APPS also covers foreign-flagged ships while in the
“navigable waters” of the United States. 86 “Navigable waters,” for
purposes of APPS, include the territorial sea of the United States,
which extends out twelve nautical miles from the baseline of the US
coast. 87 APPS also governs port reception facilities at any port or
terminal within the United States. 88
In order to prevent oil releases into the world’s oceans and seas,
MARPOL 73/78 and APPS specifically regulate:
[b]allasting or cleaning of fuel oil tanks . . . [d]ischarge of ballast

containing an oily mixture or cleaning water from fuel oil
tanks . . . [d]isposal of oil residue . . . [d]ischarge overboard or
disposal otherwise of bilge water that has accumulated in
machinery spaces . . . [b]unkering of fuel or bulk lubricating

81. H.R. 6665 - Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/6665/actions [https://perma.cc/48T9NT8H].
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1908 (2018).
83. Vollaard, supra note 8, at 7.
84. See United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 24 F. Supp. 2d 155, 158 (D.P.R.
1997). The US Coast Guard continues to use “fingerprint matching” to identify the source of
oil found in marine environments. See, e.g., United States Coast Guard News Release, Unified
command
identifies
oil,
clean-up
operations
continue,
(Apr.
3,
2019),
https://incidentnews.noaa.gov/incident/9872#!542005 [https://perma.cc/AE55-F6MY].
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(1) (2018).
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(2) (2018).
87. 33 CFR § 2.22.(2019).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(4) (2018).
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oil . . . [a]ny failure and the reasons for, of the oil filtering
equipment. 89

MARPOL 73/78 and APPS require oil tankers, weighing 150
gross tons or more, and ships, weighing 400 gross tons or more, to 1)
implement technology designed to regulate the amount of oil that can
be discharged with waste produced during the regular operation of a
vessel; and 2) to be equipped with oil-water separators (“OWS”), oilcontent meters (“OCM”), and an oil record book (“ORB”). 90 OWSs
reduce the amount of oil contained in a ship’s wastewater by
periodically skimming oil off the top layer of oil-contaminated
wastewater. 91 OCMs sounds an alarm if the oil content of a ship’s
effluent contains more than fifteen parts per million of oil. 92 ORBs
must document all treated and untreated discharges of oilcontaminated wastewater.93 The ORB must be preserved for at least
three years and must be signed by the ship’s master. 94 Annex I of
MARPOL 73/78 provides that the government officials of MARPOL
73/78 signatories may inspect a vessel’s ORB while that vessel is
docked at its ports. 95 The oil that is skimmed from the top of the
wastewater must be stored on board the vessel and is held for disposal
in a shore-side port reception facility. 96
IV. NON-COMPLIANCE WITH MARPOL 73/78 AND APPS
Ship’s masters, engineers, and crews often bypass OWSs to
avoid the time and costs associated with proper storage, maintenance,
and disposal at ports of the oil separated from the ship’s oilcontaminated wastewater. 97 Owners and operators of ships
89. 33 C.F.R. § 151.25(d)(1)-(6).
90. See United States v. Abrogar, 459 F.3d 430, 432 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Homer,
supra note 11, at 153.
91. See Abrogar, 459 F.3d at 432; see also Homer, supra note 11, at 153.
92. See Abrogar, 459 F.3d at 432; see also Homer, supra note 11, at 153.
93. See Abrogar, 459 F.3d at 432; see also Homer, supra note 11, at 153.
94. See MARPOL 73/78, annex I, reg. 20(3), (5), supra note 2; see Berg, supra note 11,
at 256.
95. MARPOL 73/78, annex I, reg. 20(3), (5), supra note 2.
96. Homer, supra note 11, at 150; MARPOL 73/78, annex I, reg. 1(1), supra note 2.
97. See Homer, supra note 11, at 151; see also Benedict S. Gullo, The Illegal Discharge
of Oil on the High Seas; The U.S. Coast Guard’s Ongoing Battle Against Vessel Polluters and
a New Approach Toward Establishing Environmental Compliance, 209 MIL. L. REV. 122, 129,
131 (2011).
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compensate ship masters, engineers, and crew members with
performance bonuses for completing a voyage below the vessel’s
projected operating budget. 98 With respect to shipments of cargo,
owners and operators of ships also reward ship masters, engineers,
and crew members for delivering the cargo ahead of schedule. 99
A. Incentives to Intentionally Release Oil from Ships
Because oil discharge standards are stringent and therefore
taxing on OWSs, OWS filters and membranes frequently fail
mechanically, requiring engineers to neglect their other duties and
spend time repairing malfunctioning OWSs. 100 It is not uncommon
for ships to lack the parts necessary to effectuate required repairs of
their oil-pollution-control devices. Proper shore-side disposal of oil at
port reception facilities is expensive and time-consuming. 101
To minimize operating costs and to save valuable time, ships’
owners, operators, and crewmembers often bypass a vessel’s OWS to
illegally dispose of oil. 102 While corporate and on-board personnel
may have numerous incentives to defy the requirements of Annex I of
MARPOL 73/78, § 1908(a) provides them with a countervailing
incentive to report violators. Section 1908(a) of APPS allows for
compensation to be paid to whistleblowers in “an amount equal to not
more than ½ of [the] fine” imposed on the vessel’s owner or
operator. 103

98. See CHRISTINE B.N. CHIN, CRUISING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: PROFITS,
PLEASURE AND WORK AT SEA 73 (2008); see also Homer, supra note 11, at 152.
99. See CHIN, supra note 98, at 73; see also Homer, supra note 11, at 152.
100. Homer, supra note 11, at 151; see also Gullo, supra note 97, at 131.
101. Homer, supra note 11, at 151-52; see also Gullo, supra note 97, at 128.
102. See Gullo, supra note 97, at 129, 134-35.
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a) (2018).
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B. Common Methods of Deceiving Oil-Pollution Monitoring and
Prevention Devices

Figure 1: This diagram shows two common ways magic pipes are
used to bypass a vessel’s OWS. 104
Magic pipes may be used to bypass the bilge water holding tank by
pumping water from the bilge wells directly overboard before the

104. Magic Pipes, NEPIA (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.nepia.com/insights/signalsonline/ships/pollution/magic-pipes/ [https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=4035-4828857901-57902].
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bilge water is stored in the bilge water holding tank. 105 Bilge water is
stored in a bilge holding tank before it is pumped through an OWS. 106
Magic pipes may also be used to discharge overboard bilge water that
has been stored in a bilge holding tank before that water is run
through a vessel’s OWS. 107
To deceive OCMs into registering oil discharges within
acceptable parameters when they release oil-contaminated wastewater
from their ships, ship engineers, with the assistance of crewmembers,
resort to tricks including periodically flushing the oil-contaminated
wastewater with clean water so that the oil-contaminated wastewater
becomes sufficiently diluted that its concentration of oil is below
fifteen parts per million when it reaches the OCM. 108 Ship engineers
also subvert the pollution-control systems of ships by diverting the
valves designed to direct oil skimmed from wastewater by OWSs and
jettisoning it overboard before it reaches the ship’s oil storage
tanks. 109 Ship engineers use detachable pipes, sometimes referred to
as “magic pipes,” to dispose of excess oil-contaminated wastewater
from a ship’s holding tank into the seas and oceans. 110 These devices
received the moniker “magic pipes” because they make the oilcontaminated wastewater contained in bilge tanks “magically”
disappear. 111 Magic pipes are disconnected and hidden when ships
dock at ports of call so that they are not visible when the ship is
boarded by government personnel for inspections. 112 Ship engineers
employ magic pipes for a number of reasons including: to correct tank
levels to match an incorrect ORB entry; to dispose of excess bilge
water if bilge water holding tanks are filling up; if the engineers do
not know how to operate OWS; or if OWSs are not properly

105. Mayur Agarwal, An Overview of Sludge and Bilge Management on Board Ships,
MARINE INSIGHT (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-law/magicpipe-the-mystery-of-the-illegal-activity-still-continues-on-ships/.
106. See id.
107. Magic Pipes, supra note 104; see also Gullo, supra note 97, at 135-36.
108. United States v. Kun Yun Jho, 465 F. Supp. 2d 618, 627 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
109. Id.
110. Ranuek Kantharia, Magic Pipe: The Mystery of the Illegal Activity Still Continues
on Ships, MARINE INSIGHT (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.marineinsight.com/maritimelaw/magic-pipe-the-mystery-of-the-illegal-activity-still-continues-on-ships/
[https://perma.cc/8GT9-AGPG].
111. Id.
112. Id.

2019]

HIDING BEHIND THE FLAG

1493

maintained and, therefore, are not functioning. 113 Ship engineers may
also use magic pipes to dispose of oil-contaminated wastewater
before arriving at ports in less-developed countries, which lack
resources to invest in adequate port reception facilities for proper
waste disposal. 114
V. JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF
THE OIL DISCHARGE PROHIBITION OF APPS
Section 1908(a) of APPS authorizes criminal penalties for
“knowing” violations of MARPOL 73/78. 115 A knowing violation of
Annex I’s prohibition against illegally discharging oil is a Class D
felony, and, hence, each violation is punishable by incarceration for
not less than five years nor more than ten years. 116 Section 1907(c)(2)
of APPS provides that “while at a port or terminal subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, a ship . . . may be inspected by the
[Coast Guard]” and authorizes the US Coast Guard to take “any
additional action required by Article 6 of [the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Seas],” which provides that “if an
inspection indicates a violation of [the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Seas], a report shall be forwarded to the [vessel’s flag
state] for any appropriate action.” 117
A. The Law of the Flag
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
(“UNCLOS”) was promulgated in 1982 to establish an international
legal framework with respect to the use of the high seas. Several
provisions of UNCLOS govern the enforcement of MARPOL
73/78. 118 As of March 2019, there are 168 parties and 157 signatories
to UNCLOS. 119 Although the United States is not a party to
UNCLOS, the provisions of UNCLOS contain generally accepted
113. Id.
114. A Corrupt Corporate Culture, MOTORSHIP - INSIGHT FOR MARINE TECHNOLOGY
PROFESSIONALS (June 12, 2018), https://www.motorship.com/news101/ships-equipment/acorrupt-corporate-culture/ [https://perma.cc/HN35-9P9X].
115. 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a) (2018).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(4) (2018).
117. 33 U.S.C. § 1907(c)(2) (2018); MARPOL art. 6(2), supra note 2.
118. UNCLOS, supra note 13.
119. UNCLOS, supra note 13.
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principles of maritime law and therefore UNCLOS’s provisions are
considered to be customary international law by courts in the United
States. 120 The Fifth Circuit has clarified that, although the United
States is not a UNCLOS signatory, section 1912 of APPS, which
states that “any action taken under [APPS] shall be taken in
accordance with international law,” means that, effectively, APPS
incorporates UNCLOS “to the extent that UNCLOS reflects
customary international law.” 121 The law of the flag, as enunciated in
UNCLOS, has long been considered a customary provision of
international maritime law within the United States. 122
Article 216 of UNCLOS, which codifies the law of the flag
doctrine with respect to marine pollution by dumping, stipulates that
only a vessel’s flag state has authority to enforce that vessel’s
violations of MARPOL 73/78 unless such violation occurred within
the territorial waters of another signatory of MARPOL 73/78, in
which case jurisdiction is concurrent. 123 Article 230(2) of UNCLOS
further narrows the scope of the criminal penalties provision of
MARPOL 73/78 by limiting the imposition of criminal penalties with
respect to intentional marine discharges of oil to “case[s] of willful
and serious act[s] of pollution in the territorial sea.” 124 UNCLOS does
not define what constitutes “serious” acts of pollution. 125
B. Flags of Convenience
Vessel owners often choose to register their vessels in nations
that issue “flags of convenience,” even if the owner of the vessel has
no other connection to the flag state. 126 Nations that issue flags of
120. See Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1369
(S.D. FL. 1998). President Bill Clinton signed UNCLOS; however, the Senate, which must
confirm presidential enactment of a treaty, failed to ratify it. See Recent Developments: A
Review of Recent Developments in Ocean and Coastal Law, 13 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 143,
149 (2007).
121. 33 U.S.C. § 1912; see United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 406-07 (5th Cir. 2008).
122. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 21
(1963) (noting that it is a “well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag
state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship”).
123. UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 216.
124. UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 230(2).
125. United States v. Royal Caribbean, 24 F. Supp. 2d 155, 160 (D.P.R. 1997).
126. Tina Shaughnessy & Ellen Tobin, Flags of Inconvenience: Freedom and Insecurity
on the High Seas, 5 PENN. J. INT’L LAW & POL’Y 1, 2, (2006).
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convenience generally permit registration of vessels by non-citizens,
facilitate registration, charge low taxes and fees, allow ships to be
manned by international crews, and impose minimal equipment and
maintenance requirements on the vessels registered under their
flags. 127 The monies that nations issuing flags of convenience garner
from ship registries tend to be a substantial portion of their domestic
revenues. 128 Moreover, ships rarely call on ports in flag-ofconvenience nations. 129 Because the market for flags of convenience
is lucrative and, therefore, highly competitive, it is unlikely that a
flag-of-convenience state would jeopardize its relationship with its
ship-registry clients by prosecuting them or the masters, engineers, or
crewmembers of their ships for environmental pollution offenses. 130
C. Enforcement of Annex I’s Prohibition of Intentional Releases of
Oil Against Foreign-Flagged Vessels in US Territorial Waters
Vessels registered in the United States are bound by the
provisions of APPS wherever in the world they are located. 131 APPS
therefore prohibits the knowing release of effluent contaminated with
more than fifteen parts per million of oil by any US-flagged vessels,
whether or not the release occurs within the territorial waters of the
United States. APPS does not, however, apply to US military vessels
or any other vessels in times of declared national emergencies or
wars. 132 Similarly, foreign-flagged vessels may be prosecuted by the
United States if they unlawfully discharge oil into the territorial
waters of the United States. 133
In United States. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. (“Royal
Caribbean I”) 134, Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., a Liberian
corporation headquartered in Miami, Florida (“Royal Caribbean”),
sought dismissal of criminal charges brought against it in its capacity
127. Id. at 14.
128. Id.
129. Dempsey, supra note 40, at 526.
130. Dempsey & Helling, Oil Pollution by Ocean Vessels—An Environmental Tragedy:
The Legal Regime of Flags of Convenience, Multilateral Conventions and Coastal States, 10
DEN. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 37, 63 (1980).
131. 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(1) (2018).
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1902(b)(2)(B) (2018).
133. 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(2) (2018).
134. See United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 24 F. Supp. 2d 155 (D.P.R.
1997).
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as the parent company of the corporate owner of the Norway-flagged
cruise ship Sovereign of the Seas as well as against the cruise ship’s
chief engineer and first engineer. 135 Royal Caribbean and the
Sovereign of the Seas’s chief engineer and first engineer were charged
in connection with the intentional discharge of thirty gallons of oil
into the territorial waters of the United States off the coast of Puerto
Rico. 136 The US District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied
the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictments for lack of
jurisdiction under the law of the flag because “the law of the flag
applies only to jurisdiction over the aboard activities of ships and
their personnel,” but “[t]he pollution . . . being prosecuted . . .
occurred outside the ship and therefore outside the jurisdiction of
Norway under the law of the flag.” 137
However, although the oil release at issue occurred within the
territorial waters of the United States, the court held that the discharge
of thirty gallons of oil did not constitute a “serious act of pollution”
under UNCLOS, limiting the sanctions available for prosecutions of
illegal discharges of oil, even in the territorial waters of the United
States. 138 The ship’s engineers charged with the illegal discharge of
oil could not be incarcerated and would only be subject to monetary
penalties. 139 UNCLOS stipulates that a coastal state may only impose
monetary fines, and not prison sentences, when a foreign-flagged
vessel violates national laws and regulations that address the
prevention, reduction, and control of maritime pollution unless a
135. See id. at 157, 160.
136. See id. at 157, 160. For reference purposes, a 2019 Chevrolet Suburban has a
gasoline tank capacity of 31.0 gallons. 2019 Chevrolet Suburban Features & Specs,
EDMUNDS, https://www.edmunds.com/chevrolet/suburban/2019/features-specs/.
137. Royal Caribbean Cruises, 24 F. Supp 2d at 160. The court also denied the
defendants’ motions to dismiss for other charges including: failing to notify the US Coast
Guard of the oil discharge under 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5); knowingly and willfully making false
statements to United States Coast Guard officials under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by claiming that
waste oil found under the OWS came from a blown seal on a fuel oil purifier and that the
OWS was working properly when the defendants knew it was not; knowingly and willfully
making a false statement in writing to the US Coast Guard officials regarding the OWS in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by submitting to them a falsified ORB representing that no
discharges of contaminated bilge waste were made without the use of the OWS; witness
tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) and § 1512(b)(1); and finally obstruction of
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B). Hence, prosecution of these related offenses
were allowed to proceed.
138. See id.
139. See id.
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willful and serious act of pollution is committed within the territorial
waters of the coastal state. 140 The chief engineer and first engineer of
the Sovereign of the Seas could not be incarcerated. Royal Caribbean,
which was also under indictment for other maritime pollution
offenses, ultimately entered into a plea agreement with the
Department of Justice under which it agreed to pay US$8 million to
Puerto Rico. 141 Royal Caribbean also agreed to submit to an
environmental compliance plan and corporate probation. 142
D. Liability of the Officers of Corporate Owners of Vessels for
Violations of APPS
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be
held liable for a tortious act committed by its employee so long as the
act is committed within the scope of the employee’s employment.143
The doctrine of respondeat superior also applies to an employer’s
criminal liability for crimes committed by employees related to their
employment. 144 As is indicated by Royal Caribbean I, corporations
may be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for their
employee’s violations of APPS, the False Statements Act, and
obstruction of justice or of agency proceedings. 145 Onshore corporate
officers and employees may even be held individually liable for
conspiring with on-board masters, engineers, and crewmembers to
violate various provisions of APPS. 146

140. Id.
141. See Royal Caribbean Sentenced for Fleet-Wide Conspiracy of Dumping Oil and
Lying to the Coast Guard, US DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 17, 1998), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/opa/pr/1998/September/429_enr.htm [https://perma.cc/MNX8-EG7C].
142. See id.
143. See generally Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1994).
144. See Homer, supra note 11, at 162 (citing United States v. George F. Fish, 154 F.2d
798, 801 (2d Cir. 1946)).
145. See United States v. Royal Caribbean, 24 F. Supp. 2d 155, 161 (D.P.R. 1997).
146. See, e.g., Executive Charged and Corporations Plead Guilty to Pollution
Conspiracy to Hide Oil Discharges at Sea, US DEP’T OF JUST.(Aug. 22, 2002),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2002/August/02_enrd_487.htm
[https://perma.cc/S3SL-ZZLN].
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E. Enforcement of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Against ForeignFlagged Vessels in US Territorial Waters
The United States may also prosecute ships’ owners, operators,
masters, engineers, and crewmembers who are involved in
intentionally releasing oil into the territorial waters or inland waters of
the United States under other domestic statutes. The Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 (“OPA 90”), 147 which amended the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1973, 148 penalizes the discharge of a “harmful quantity
of oil” by any vessel of any size into the inland waters of the United
States, the navigable waters of the United States, or into the waters of
the contiguous zone. 149 The contiguous zone extends out twelve miles
from the baseline. 150 OPA 90 also prohibits any discharges of oil that
“affect natural resources belonging to . . . the U.S.” through the
exclusive economic zone of the United States, which extends out 200
miles from the baseline. 151
Although, like APPS, OPA 90 imposes penalties for the
intentional discharge of oil from ships, OPA 90 also imposes
penalties on unintentional and accidental discharges of oil from both
ships and oilrigs. 152 It is with respect to these unintentional oil spills
that OPA 90 is most often invoked because unlawful intentional
discharges of oil tend not to occur within the well-guarded territorial
waters of the United States. In cases of accidental or intentional oil
releases, OPA 90 caps liability for vessels weighing more than three
million gross tons at US$1,200 per gross tonne or US$10 million,
whichever is greater. 153 OPA 90 also permits the US government to
recover costs incurred in the restoration of natural resources that were
damaged as a result of the discharge of oil and establishes the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund. 154
The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund may cover the costs of oil
removal. After the oil spill is cleaned up, the Justice Department will
147. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2018).
148. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2018).
149. See 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (2019).
150. See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 7.
151. See 33 C.F.R. § 2.30 (2019).
152. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(7) (2018).
153. See Sharona Hoffman, Criminal Sanctions in Accidental Oil Spill Cases –
Punishment Without a Crime, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1033, 1041 (1992).
154. See 33 U.S.C. § 1486 (1990).
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sue the liable party to recover the government’s oil-spill cleanup
expenditures following completion of the cleanup, even if the oil is
discharged accidentally. 155 OPA 90 sets forth a large variety of
remedies for private plaintiffs and the federal and state governments
in the form of high civil and administrative fines for noncompliance
with administrative orders. 156
OPA 90 holds the owners and operators of vessels strictly liable
for the costs of removing spilled oil and for the damage even if it is
caused by accidental discharges. 157 OPA 90 includes several complete
defenses to liability for removal costs or damages. These defenses
include: an act of God; an act of war; and an “act or omission of a
third party, other than an employee or agent of the responsible party
or a third party whose act or omission occurs in connection with any
contractual relationship with the responsible party.” 158 However,
these defenses are not applicable to deliberate releases of oil into the
marine environment.
Charges for the deliberate release in US territorial waters of oil
by foreign-flagged vessels under OPA 90 are rare, but do get filed.
Recently, Avin International LTD and Nicos I.V. Special Maritime
Enterprises, two Greek shipping companies, were charged with failure
to report discharges of oil under OPA 90 and negligent discharge of
oil under OPA 90. 159 The M/T Nicos IV, a Greek-flagged vessel,
155. See Hoffman, supra note 153, at 1041.
156. See id. at 1044.
157. Judicially recoverable civil fines under OPA 90 include damages for “injury to,
destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of, natural resources”; “economic losses resulting from
destruction of, real or personal property”; the “loss of subsistence use of natural resources”;
the “net loss of taxes, royalties, rents, fees, or net profit shares due to the injury”; damages
resulting from “the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to injury, destruction,
or loss of real property”; and, the “net costs of providing increased or additional public
services during or after removal activities.” 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A)-(b)(2)(F) (1990).
158. The “responsible party” must demonstrate that it exercised due care and took
precautions against the foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party. OPA 90’s defenses are
not available if the “responsible party” knows or has reason to know of the spill but fails or
refuses to report it; fails or refuses to cooperate or provide assistance requested by the
responsible government official with regard to the removal activity; or fails to comply with an
order made pursuant to OPA 90’s liability provision or made pursuant to the Intervention on
the High Seas Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 2703 (a)(1)-(3); 33 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
159. See Two Greek Shipping Companies Plead Guilty to Illegally Discharging Oil Into
Texas Port Waters, US DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/twogreek-shipping-companies-plead-guilty-illegally-discharging-oil-texas-port-waters
[https://perma.cc/JG5C-SJML].
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illegally jettisoned oil in the waters of the United States off the coast
of Texas.160 The Greek shipping companies were required to pay
US$4 million in criminal fines and to serve a four-year term of
probation, during which the companies’ vessels must implement
environmental compliance plans. 161
VI. PROSECUTIONS OF CRIMES RELATING TO COVERING-UP
INTENTIONAL RELEASES OF OIL BY FOREIGN-FLAGGED
VESSELS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS
When it comes to foreign-flagged vessels illegally releasing oil
into international waters, it’s “not the crime, it’s the cover-up” that
gives rise to liability. 162 At least one federal district court has opined
that if ship owners, operators, masters, engineers, and crewmembers
of foreign-flagged vessels accurately recorded their unlawful
discharges of oil in their ORBs and responded honestly to all
questions posed to them by US Coast Guard official regarding their
illegal oil discharges on the high seas, there would be little, if
anything, that the United States could do to hold them accountable for
their actions. 163 In the words of the Florida Southern District Court in
a case involving the submission to US Coast Guard Officials of a
falsified ORB, “were the Oil Record Book accurate, in that it
reflected any and all alleged illegal oil discharges, there would be no
possible . . . prosecution in this action.” 164 However, to date, no one
has tested this theory.
In a series of cases beginning in the 1990s, federal district and
circuit courts in the United States and its territories began upholding
Department of Justice prosecutions relating to violations of APPS
based upon actions taken by ship owners and operators, masters,
engineers, and crew members to “cover up” unlawful discharges of
oil, which themselves could not be prosecuted due to the law of the
flag or other reasons. These cases upheld the right of the US
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. It is believed that this frequently used saying originated during the investigation of
the Watergate scandal in the early 1970s. See Phillip C. Bobbitt, Impeachment: A Handbook,
YALE L.J. F. 515, 581 (2018).
163. See Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1371 (S.D.
FL. 1998).
164. Id.
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government to pursue indictments for false statements made to US
officials directly or via inaccurate entries or lack of required entries in
ORBs under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b)(2)(B), and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371.
A. False Statements Act (18 U.S.C. § 1001)
The False Statements Act criminalizes the making of a false
statement to agents of the US government, including “knowingly and
willfully . . . mak[ing] or us[ing] any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or entry.” 165 Because under the law of the flag
the United States is not able to prosecute deliberate releases of oil by
foreign-flagged vessels on the high seas, the United States has
resorted to prosecuting efforts to conceal the deliberate, illegal
discharge of oil. One of the charges upon which US prosecutors have
relied in bringing criminal charges in connection with illegal marine
oil releases into international waters is the presentation to US Coast
Guard officers of falsified ORBs in violation of the False Statement
Act. 166
Initially, it was unclear whether, if false ORB entries were made
on the high seas, the United States had jurisdiction to prosecute such
entries under the False Statements Act.167 In Royal Caribbean
Cruises, Ltd. v. United States, 168 (“Royal Caribbean II”), the
Department of Justice brought charges against Royal Caribbean after
Forward Looking Infrared Radar on a US Coast Guard aircraft
detected Royal Caribbean’s Nordic Empress releasing a seven-mile
long oil slick off the coast of the Bahamas. 169 US Coast Guard
officers inspected the Nordic Empress when it arrived at port in
Miami, but found no record of the discharge in the vessel’s ORB. 170
The United States referred this violation of MARPOL 73/78 to
Liberia, the flag state of the Nordic Empress, which, not

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
See, e.g., Royal Caribbean Cruises, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1370-73.
See Berg, supra note 11, at 262.
See Royal Caribbean Cruises, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358.
See id. at 1361.
See id.
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unsurprisingly, declined to prosecute Royal Caribbean for illegally
jettisoning oil off the coast of the Bahamas. 171
The Department of Justice charged Royal Caribbean with
presenting a falsified ORB to the US Coast Guard in violation of the
False Statements Act. 172 Royal Caribbean sought to have the
indictment dismissed on several grounds, including lack of
jurisdiction, because Royal Caribbean contended that any act or
omission with respect to its maintenance of the Nordic Empress’s
ORB occurred on the high seas. 173 The District Court for the Southern
District of Florida refused to dismiss the false-statements indictment,
holding that under MARPOL 73/78, “the United States, via the
United States Coast Guard, has the duty and the obligation to board
and inspect ships while in port and to pursue appropriate measures to
address any violations [of MARPOL 73/78].” 174 Because boarding
and inspecting foreign-flagged ships in US ports to assess possible
MARPOL 73/78 violations are “part of the regularly conducted
activities of the United States Coast Guard . . . false statements made
in connection with those activities . . . fall within the jurisdiction of §
1001.” 175 The court also found a basis for jurisdiction under the False
Statements Act in the “extraterritoriality doctrine” because, although
the offense of unlawfully discharging oil into the sea occurred in
international waters, it compromised the US Coast Guard’s function
by undermining the laws that the US Coast Guard is charged with
enforcing. 176 The court rejected the defendant’s argument that APPS
preempts the False Statements Act and ordered the defendant to pay a
US$1 million criminal fine under the False Statements Act. 177
B. Failure to Maintain an Accurate ORB (33 U.S.C. § 1908(a))
United States v. Petraia Maritime Ltd. 178 marks a shift toward
prosecuting the failure to maintain an accurate ORB under APPS
171. See id. at 1362.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 1364.
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. See Royal Caribbean Sentenced for Fleet-Wide Conspiracy of Dumping Oil and
Lying to the Coast Guard, supra note 141.
178. See United States v. Petraia Maritime Ltd., 483 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Me. 2007).
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rather than prosecuting defendants solely under the False Statements
Act for presenting a falsified ORB to the Coast Guard. 179 In Petraia,
the District of Maine adopted the magistrate’s recommendation to
deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges the United States
brought against it for failure to maintain its ORB in violation of
APPS. 180 The District of Maine did not elaborate on its rationale for
so doing. 181
United States v. Jho 182 was the first case in which a US Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled on whether the United States may prosecute
foreign-flagged vessels for failure to maintain an accurate ORB under
APPS. In Jho, whistleblowers who served on board the M/T Pacific
Ruby, an ocean-going petroleum tanker registered in Hong Kong,
informed the US Coast Guard that the tanker’s chief engineer had
been unlawfully discharging oil while on the high seas and that he had
manipulated the ship’s pollution-detection equipment to conceal the
discharges. 183 US Coast Guard officials inspected the vessel while it
was docked in Texas and brought a multi-count indictment against the
chief engineer and the vessel’s corporate owner relating to the
coverup of the illegal releases of oil. 184
Counts 3–10 of the indictment related to the chief engineer’s
“knowing failure to maintain” an ORB in violation of APPS. 185 The
chief engineer and the vessel’s corporate owner filed motions to
dismiss the ORB charges. 186 The defendants argued that the US
government could not prosecute them for making false entries into an
ORB because the entries were made in international waters. 187
The Fifth Circuit held that APPS’s “requirement that an oil
record book be ‘maintained’ . . . impos[es] a duty upon a foreignflagged vessel to ensure that its oil record book is accurate . . . upon
entering the ports of navigable waters of the United States.” 188 The
Fifth Circuit explained that if courts were not able to prosecute those
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See id. at 35–36.
See id.
See id.
See United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2008).
See id. at 400.
See id. at 401.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 403.
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who illegally discharged oil for failure to maintain an accurate ORB
while within the navigable waters of the United States, then a ship’s
owners, operators, master, engineers, or crew could circumvent
APPS’s ORB requirements “by falsifying all of its record book
information just before entry into a port or navigable waters,” and this
would “frustrate the government’s ability to enforce MARPOL’s
requirements.” 189 The Fifth Circuit also concluded that the lower
court had misapplied the law of the flag doctrine. In rejecting the
lower court’s conclusion that the United States did not have
jurisdiction over this matter, the Fifth Circuit explained that:
The law of the flag doctrine does not mandate that anything that
occurs aboard a ship must be handled by the flag state. In fact, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the law of the flag doctrine does
not completely trump a sovereign’s territorial jurisdiction to prosecute
violations of its laws: “[The law of the flag doctrine] is chiefly
applicable to ships on the high seas, where there is no territorial
sovereign; and as respects ships in foreign territorial waters it has
little application beyond what is affirmatively or tacitly permitted by
the local sovereign.” 190
The Environmental Crimes Division of the Department of
Justice reports that Overseas Shipholding Group (“OSG”), the
vessel’s corporate owner, was sentenced to pay approximately US$37
million in criminal fines including US$9.2 million in community
service payments. 191 OSG was subject to a three-year probation
period during which it was subject to an environmental compliance
plan and outside audits. 192 The whistleblowers were jointly awarded
US$5.25 million. 193
In United States v. Ionia Management, S.A., 194 the Second
Circuit became the second US Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold the
189. Id.
190. Id. at 406 (citing Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923)).
191. See Tanker Company Sentenced for Concealing Deliberate Vessel Pollution, US
DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 21, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/March/07
_enrd_171.html [https://perma.cc/TN8H-UPBX].
192. See id.
193. See Homer, supra note 11, at 161; see also Tanker Company Sentenced for
Concealing Deliberate Vessel Pollution, supra note 191 (noting that twelve US$437,500
whistleblower awards were awarded for an aggregate total award of US$5.25 million to all
twelve whistleblowers).
194. See United States v. Ionia Management, S.D., 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2008).
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United States’ ability to prosecute a foreign-flagged vessel’s failure to
maintain an accurate ORB within the waters of the United States
under APPS. 195 The chief engineer and the second engineer on the
M/T Kriton, a 600-foot Bahamian-flagged oil tanker that delivered oil
and petroleum products to various ports on the east coast of the
United States, had been discharging oil-contaminated waste on the
high seas using a magic pipe, which allowed the engineers to bypass
the vessel’s OWS. 196 The chief engineer and the second engineer
made false entries into the ORB to cover up these illegal discharges of
oil and presented this inaccurate ORB to the US Coast Guard at
various US ports during inspections of the vessel. 197 The vessel’s
owner, a Greek corporation, was charged with thirteen counts under
APPS. 198 The corporation appealed its conviction, arguing that the
district court did not have jurisdiction to prosecute it under APPS for
failure to “maintain” an accurate ORB because it did not make the
false entries in the territorial waters of the United States, it only
“possessed” the false ORB within the territorial waters of the United
States. 199 The Second Circuit rejected this argument as out of hand
and interpreted “maintain” as “impos[ing] a duty upon ships, upon
entering the ports or navigable waters of the United States, to ensure
that its ORB is accurate (or at least not knowingly inaccurate).”200
The Second Circuit also upheld as reasonable the US$4.9 million fine
that the District of Connecticut had imposed on Ionia Management,
S.A. for its violations of APPS. 201
C. Obstruction of Justice and of Agency Proceedings (18 U.S.C. §
1505 and 18 U.S.C. § 1519)
A ship’s owner, operator, master, engineers, or crewmembers
may be charged with obstruction of justice or obstruction of agency
proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 1505—“Obstruction of proceedings
before departments, agencies, and committees,” or under the related

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See id. at 311.
See id. at 305.
See id.
See id. at 306.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 311.
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“Sarbanes-Oxley Act,” 18 U.S.C. § 1519 for offenses such as
concealing a magic pipe during a Coast Guard inspection.
Section 1505 provides that whoever:
willfully withholds, misrepresents, . . . conceals, covers up,
destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any
documentary material . . . or attempts to do so or solicits another
to do so; or [w]hoever corruptly . . . impedes or endeavors to
influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration
of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had
before any department or agency of the United States . . . [s]hall
be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years . . . or
both. 202

For purposes of section 1505, “corruptly” means “acting with an
improper purpose . . . including making a false or misleading
statement,” and courts have held that presenting false documents or
making false statements during an agency investigation amount to a
violation of section 1505. 203 The defendant does not need to
successfully obstruct the agency’s proceeding, it must only attempt to
do so. 204
Additionally, section 1519, sometimes also referred to as the
Enron Act because it was enacted in response to the Enron scandal of
2001, imposes fines or imprisonment for not more than twenty years,
or both, on an individual who:
knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up,
falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States
or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation
of any such matter or case. 205

There are two advantages to prosecutors of charging section
1519 instead of section 1505. The “knowing” mens rea standard in
section 1519 is a “less stringent” standard than the “corruptly”
standard in section 1505. 206 Additionally, the US government must
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2018).
18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (2018); Kehoe, supra note 1, at 37.
See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 37.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2018).
See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 38.
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only prove that the “obstructive conduct” was “in relation to or in
contemplation” of the government or agency’s investigation without
the “pending proceeding” requirement of section 1505. 207
For example, in United States v. Sanford, 208 two successive chief
engineers of a F/V San Nikunau, a New-Zealand-flagged purse-seine
tuna-fishing vessel were indicted for, among other crimes connected
to covering up unlawful discharges of oil in the South Pacific,
violations of section 1505 and section 1519 with respect to false ORB
entries. 209 One of the two chief engineers entered into a plea
agreement with the US government. 210 He admitted that “it was
routine practice onboard the vessel to discharge directly into the sea
oily bilge waste from the engine room . . . without using required
pollution prevention equipment.” 211 He also admitted to falsifying
ORB entries and to lying to the US Coast Guard about OWS use. 212
Subsequently, the District Court for the District of Columbia
denied multiple motions by the other chief engineer and Sanford Ltd.,
the corporate owner of the San Nikunau, to dismiss obstruction of
justice charges, including dismissal motions based upon assertions
that the charges were duplicative. 213 In this case, however, Sanford
Ltd. was fined US$1.9 million and ordered to pay US$500,000 to the
Fagatele Bay National Marine Sanctuary in American Samoa and the
former Chief Engineer was sentenced to thirty days in prison, two
years of supervised release, and ordered to pay US$6,000 as a
criminal fine. 214

207. Id.
208. See United States v. Sanford, Ltd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
209. See id. at 102.
210. See Former Chief Engineer of South Pacific Tuna Vessel Pleads Guilty to Covering
up Environmental Crimes, US DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 17, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/former-chief-engineer-south-pacific-tuna-vessel-pleads-guilty-covering-environmentalcrimes [https://perma.cc/VEA3-JQ5J].
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. See Sanford, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 124.
214. See Court hands down sentences in San Nikunau case, MARINELOG (Jan. 14,
2013),
https://www.marinelog.com/news/court-hands-down-sentences-in-san-nikunau-case/
[https://perma.cc/2FCK-3PHV].
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D. Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371)
The individuals involved in covering up illegal oil discharges on
the high seas can be charged with conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §
371—“Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States.”
This statute provides that:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof . . . and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 215

In United States v. Jho, in addition to being charged with
violating § 1908(a) of APPS, the chief engineer of the Pacific Ruby
was charged with conspiring with crewmembers and with the vessel’s
corporate owner. 216 According to the prosecution, in furtherance of
this alleged conspiracy, the chief engineer taught other crewmembers
how to flush the OCM with freshwater in order to “trick” it into
registering complying wastewater discharges and showed other
crewmembers how to “defeat” the ship’s anti-pollution devices from
detecting this deceptive practice. 217 The chief engineer was also
charged with conspiring with the vessel’s corporate owner to fail to
maintain an accurate ORB. 218 Although the conspiracy charges with
respect to “defeating” the anti-pollution devices were dismissed
because they occurred on the high seas, the District Court denied the
chief engineer’s motion to dismiss the conspiracy charges with
respect to maintaining an accurate ORB. 219 The Fifth Circuit upheld
the district court’s decision as to the ORB-conspiracy counts. 220
E. US Sentencing Guidelines
The US Sentencing Guidelines were enacted in 1987 to promote
uniformity in criminal sentencing. 221 In United States v. Booker, the
Supreme Court held that, although these sentencing guidelines are not
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018).
See United States v. Jho, 465 F. Supp. 2d 618, 627 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
Id.
See id.
See id. at 634, 645.
See United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 410 (5th Cir. 2008).
See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 14.
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mandatory, federal courts must “consult” them in determining a
criminal sentence. 222 The US Sentencing Guidelines create a point
system of various factors that must be considered in determining
sentencing ranges for defendants. 223 The higher the level of the
federal offense, the greater the fines or prison time that can be
recommended during sentencing. 224
Section 2Q1.3 of the US Sentencing Guidelines applies to
violations of APPS. 225 In United States v. Abrogar, the chief engineer
of M/V Magellan Phoenix, a cargo vessel registered in Panama, plead
guilty to a charge of failing to maintain an accurate ORB in violation
of APPS. 226 The pre-sentencing report recommended sentencing
enhancement under section 2Q1.3 of the US Sentencing Guidelines
for repetitive discharges of oil into the environment and for the chief
engineer’s role in the ORB offense. 227 The pre-sentencing report
recommended a prison sentence of twelve to eighteen months and,
because the chief engineer had no prior criminal history, the district
court sentenced the chief engineer to a twelve-month prison
sentence. 228
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a),
which imposes criminal sanctions for “knowing” violations of
MARPOL 73/78, can only be enforced against foreign-flagged
vessels in the navigable waters of the United States or at ports or
terminals within the United States, and that this provision specifically
excludes the failure of foreign-flagged vessels to maintain accurate
ORBs when these vessels are not within the waters of the United
States. 229 The Third Circuit concluded that, since the discharges of oil
occurred outside of the waters of the United States, the releases of oil
themselves could not be considered during sentencing. 230 The Third
Circuit also concluded that because the failure to maintain an accurate
ORB did not “result” in the discharge of oil, the chief engineer’s
222. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).
223. See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 14.
224. See id. at 16.
225. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.3(a) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018); see also Kehoe, supra note 1, at 16.
226. See United States v. Abrogar, 459 F.3d 430, 433 (3d Cir. 2006).
227. See Kehoe, supra note 1 at 20.
228. See id.
229. See Abrogar, 459 F.3d at 434-35.
230. See id. at 436.
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sentencing could not be enhanced under the sentencing guidelines for
“resulting in” many illegal discharges of oil into the
“environment.” 231
VII. UNLAWFUL DISCHARGES OF OIL BY FOREIGN-FLAGGED
VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS CONTINUE
In spite of the Department of Justice’s “aggressive enforcement
of federal environmental laws” primarily through charging violators
with one or more cover-up criminal offenses, intentional discharges
into marine environments of oil-contaminated wastewater continue
unabated because the law of the flag doctrine makes it impossible for
the United States to prosecute foreign-flagged vessel for releasing oil
on the high seas. 232 According to Joe Poux, the Deputy Chief of the
Environment and Natural Resources Division of the Department of
Justice, the Environmental and Natural Resources Division has been
prosecuting between ten and fifteen pollution crimes per year. 233 The
past six years have witnessed numerous major prosecutions for the
deliberate discharge of significant quantities of oil in violation of
APPS by foreign-flagged passenger cruise lines, chemical tankers,
and cargo vessels that call on US ports. Among these are prosecutions
of Princess Cruise Lines, Aegean Shipping Management, Mineralien
Schiffarht Spedition Und Transport GmbH (“MST”), and Interorient
Marine Services Ltd.
In August 2013, the British Maritime and Coastguard Agency
informed the US Coast Guard that ships operated by Princess Cruise
Lines Ltd., a subsidiary of Carnival Cruise Lines, had been illegally
discharging oil off the coast of England. 234 A whistleblowing
engineer on the Caribbean Princess, a 290-meter long cruise ship
registered in Bermuda that can carry over 3,000 passengers and 1,200
crewmembers, reported to the British Maritime and Coastguard
231. Id. at 437.
232. Tanker Company Sentenced for Conspiring to Conceal Hazardous Condition and
Oil Pollution in Baltimore Harbor, US DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 8, 2002),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2002/March/02_enrd_131.htm
[https://perma.cc/35W7-9PPX].
233. See Phillips, supra note 18.
234. Princess Cruise Lines to Pay Largest-Ever Criminal Penalty for Deliberate Vessel
Pollution, US DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/princess-cruiselines-pay-largest-ever-criminal-penalty-deliberate-vessel-pollution [https://perma.cc/8DLWK63J].
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Agency that the ship’s crew was in the practice of using a magic pipe
to illegally discharge oil-contaminated wastewater. 235 Specifically,
the Caribbean Princess discharged approximately 4,230 gallons of oil
twenty-three miles off the coast of England. 236 When the Caribbean
Princess reached Southampton, England, the chief engineer and
senior first engineer covered up the operation by removing the magic
pipe and instructing their subordinates to deny its existence. 237 Upon
the Caribbean Princess’s arrival in the United States three weeks
after the initial report about the unlawful oil releases off the coast of
England, the US Coast Guard conducted an examination of the vessel
and reported to the Department of Justice that the vessel had been
illegally discharging oil-contaminated wastewater through bypass
equipment since 2005, one year after the ship began operating. 238 The
US Coast Guard’s investigation revealed that engineers had been
running clean seawater through the ship’s OCM to dilute the
wastewater so that it contained less than fifteen parts per million of
oil. 239 Therefore, the oil-contaminated wastewater would not set off
the OCM’s alarm. The investigators noted that the magic pipe the
ship’s crew had been using had black oil residue contained within
it. 240
The Department of Justice also determined that the Caribbean
Princess, and four other Princess cruise ships, had been discharging
oily bilge water from overflow of the greywater tanks in the
machinery space bilge. 241 Rather than processing this waste as oily
bilge waste, the waste was pumped back into the greywater system,
which was then discharged when the ship was on the high seas. 242 The
Department of Justice confirmed that salt-water valves were opened
every time that oily bilge water was being processed in the OWS to
dilute the oil content in the wastewater so that the OCM would not
stop overboard discharge due to the high oil content of the water
being processed. 243
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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In December 2016, the Department of Justice reported that
Princess Cruise Lines plead guilty to seven felony charges, including
conspiracy, obstruction of agency proceedings, and knowingly
maintaining an inaccurate ORB in violation of APPS. 244 Princess
Cruise Lines was ordered to pay a US$40 million criminal fine, the
largest of its kind, and the Department of Justice imposed a five-year
long probation on Carnival Cruise Lines, during which time all of
Carnival Cruise Lines’ subsidiaries trading within the United States
are required to implement environmental compliance plans that are
reviewed by a court-appointed monitor. 245 The whistleblower was
awarded US$1 million for reporting the violation. 246
The US$40 million penalty imposed upon Princess Cruise Lines
has not deterred other corporate operators from illegally jettisoning
oil. In February 2017, the Department of Justice reported that the
chief engineers of the T/V Green Sky, a Liberian-flagged oceangoing
chemical tanker owned by Aegean Shipping Management, plead
guilty to violating APPS’s ORB requirements and to falsifying
records. 247 The Green Sky “generate[d] large quantities of oilcontaminated waste water” because it suffered from “unusual internal
leaks that produced greater quantities of oily waste than a normal ship
of its age.” 248 The chief engineers had modified the vessel’s OWS to
discharge oil-contaminated wastewater directly overboard and failed
to report the Green Sky’s continual illegal discharge of oil into
international waters and the exclusive economic zone of the United
States. 249 The chief engineers were each sentenced to one year of

244. See Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., No.
16-20897-CR-SEITZ (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2017), available at https://www.kkc.com/assets/
site_18/files/apps/princess%20judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/N95A-LAGB].
245. See Princess Cruise Lines to Pay Largest-Ever Criminal Penalty for Deliberate
Vessel Pollution, supra note 234.
246. See id.
247. Two Vessel Engineers Convicted of Environmental and Obstruction Crimes after
Trial. Vessel Manager Pleads Guilty to Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Justice, US
DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-vessel-engineersconvicted-environmental-and-obstruction-crimes-after-trial-vessel
[https://perma.cc/L9YYWJP3].
248. Id.
249. See id.
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supervised release and Aegean Shipping Management was required to
pay a US$2 million penalty. 250
The M/V Marguerita, a Liberian-flagged cargo vessel, was
charged with illegally releasing oil on eight occasions between June
and August of 2016. The vessel’s corporate operator, MST and
MST’s owner, Reederei MS “Marguerita” GmbH & Co.
Geschlossene Investment KG, were handed a nine-count indictment
for maintaining an inaccurate ORB in violation of APPS. 251 In
November 2018, the Department of Justice announced that MST
plead guilty to violating APPS and to obstructing justice. MST has
been ordered to pay a US$3.2 million criminal penalty and to serve a
four-year probation during which its vessels will be subjected to an
environmental compliance plan. 252
Most recently in February 2019, the Department of Justice
convicted Interorient Marine Services Ltd., the corporate owner of the
Ridgebury Alexandra Z, for failing to maintain an accurate ORB in
violation of APPS. 253 The Ridgebury Alexandra Z is a petrochemical
tanker that flies the flag of the Marshall Islands. 254 Interorient pleaded
guilty to failing to maintain an accurate ORB under section 1908 (a)
of APPS. 255 Interorient will pay a US$2 million fine and is subject to
a four-year probation term during which all Interorient vessels that
250. See David Wren, Greek tanker engineers sentenced for their role in maritime
pollution case tied to Charleston, THE POST & COURIER (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.postandcourier.com/business/greek-tanker-engineers-sentenced-for-their-role-inmaritime-pollution/article_f38ca180-7e00-11e7-974a-efd49221957a.html
[https://perma.cc/NY7V-VZQQ].
251. See German Ship Management Company and Corporate Vessel Owner Indicted for
Falsification of Pollution Records, US DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/german-ship-management-company-and-corporate-vesselowner-indicted-falsification-pollution [https://perma.cc/3UNT-6PL6].
252. See German Ship Operator Sentenced to Pay $3.2 Million for Obstruction of Justice
and Falsifying Official Logs to Hide Deliberate Oil Pollution, US DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 2,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/german-shipping-operator-sentenced-pay-32-millionobstruction-justice-and-falsifying-official [https://perma.cc/MA4Q-69SZ].
253. See Tank Vessel Operator Convicted and Sentenced for Oil Discharge Offense,
Vessel Captain Indicted, US DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/tank-vessel-operator-convicted-and-sentenced-oil-discharge-offense-vessel-captainindicted [https://perma.cc/2AWR-ZH34].
254. See Ridgebury Alexandra Z, MARINETRAFFIC, https://www.marinetraffic.com/
en/ais/details/ships/shipid:714415/mmsi:538005322/imo:9439785/vessel:RIDGEBURY_ALE
XANDRA_Z [https://perma.cc/F2U6-RVJX] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
255. See Tank Vessel Operator Convicted and Sentenced for Oil Discharge Offense,
Vessel Captain Indicted, supra note 253.
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call on US port will be subjected to a Department of Justice imposed
Environmental Compliance Plan. 256 The vessel’s captain was indicted
by a grand jury for bypassing the vessel’s OWS using a magic pipe,
falsifying ORB records, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy. 257
These prosecutions indicate that prosecutions for covering up
discharges of oil on the high seas and the penalties imposed for these
crimes are inadequate to deter the owners, operators, masters,
engineers, and crewmembers of foreign-flagged vessels from
jettisoning oil on the high seas. In addition to this ongoing problem,
there remains an open question whether, with respect to deliberate
discharges of oil by marine vessels within the territorial waters of the
United States, there is a minimum amount of oil that must be
jettisoned into US territorial waters before a crime occurs under
APPS. Royal Caribbean I was decided while UNCLOS was still
pending ratification by the Senate and was, therefore, under Article 19
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties deemed to carry the
weight of law in the United States. 258 Since the Senate did not ratify
UNCLOS, it is not clear if “willful and serious” limitation remains in
effect.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Since the early 1990s, the US Department of Justice has been
aggressively prosecuting vessel’s owners, operators, masters,
engineers, and crews for covering up illegal discharges of oil.259
Federal judges have imposed significant criminal fines for such
violations and the US Department of Justice has been publicly
reporting its prosecutions and the fines resulting therefrom on its
website.260 Nevertheless, the US Department of Justice continues to
discover and prosecute between ten and fifteen cases involving the
cover-up of unlawful discharges of oil each year. 261 Even placing
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See United States v. Royal Caribbean, 24 F. Supp. 2d 155, 159 (D.P.R. 1997).
259. See Phillips, supra note 18.
260. See Phillips, supra note 18; see also Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v.
Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., No. 16-20897-CR-SEITZ (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2017), available at
https://www.kkc.com/assets/site_18/files/apps/princess%20judgment.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/N95A-LAGB].
261. See Phillips, supra note 18.
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Carnival Cruise Lines and all of its subsidiaries on probation for five
years and subjecting them to monitoring and oversight apparently was
not enough to deter them from continuing to illegally jettison oil.262
On April 10, 2019, Judge Patricia Seitz of the Southern District of
Florida held a hearing about Carnival Cruise Line’s first annual
probation inspection report, which indicated that, among other
environmental crimes committed during this monitoring period, there
were twenty-four reported instances of the jettisoning of illegal
substances, including oil. 263 Judge Seitz expressed her frustration that
the “people at the top are treating this as a gnat.” 264 A similar
sentiment was expressed by Department of Justice Deputy Chief
Poux, who lamented that “[w]e’ve seen brand new ships, straight
from the shipyards in China, [jettisoning oil] on their way over
here.” 265 Clearly, such flagrant violations of Annex I of MARPOL
73/78 are unacceptable. Both the IMO and the United States must
take steps to enhance compliance with MARPOL 73/78 and APPS
and to make the illegal discharge of oil more difficult from a practical
standpoint, as well as unprofitable. The IMO and the United States
should work together to make prosecution and severe sentences for
the deliberate discharge of oil itself and any attempts to cover it up a
virtual certainty.
A. Facilitating Compliance and Impeding Non-Compliance with
MARPOL 73/78 and APPS
Engineers and crewmembers do not always know how to operate
the OWSs, OCMs, and other equipment on their vessels. 266 Martin,
Ottaway, van Hemmen & Dolan, a marine consulting firm, conducted
262. See Taylor Dolven & Caitlin Ostroff, Carnival cruise line kept dumping sewage,
oil, food waste after conviction, report shows, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/os-ne-carnival-cruise-dumping-20190417story.html [https://perma.cc/72TX-UC5E]; Taylor Dolven, Federal judge threatens to block
Carnival ships from docking at U.S. ports, MIAMI HERALD, (Apr. 10, 2019),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/tourism-cruises/article229069589.html.
263. Id.
264. Associated Press, Judge Threatens to Stop Carnival Cruise Ships from Docking in
U.S. Over Waste Dumping, TIME (Apr. 11, 2019), http://time.com/5568651/carnival-cruisewaste-dumping/ [https://perma.cc/Q6E8-GFLK].
265. See Phillips, supra note 18.
266. See John T. Dewey, Rethinking MARPOL Enforcement, 75 U.S. COAST GUARD J.
SAFETY & SECURITY AT SEA 54, 55 (2018).
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a six-month study of members of the maritime industry to assess their
knowledge of MARPOL 73/78’s requirements and to ask surveytakers for their suggestions to improve shipboard oil-waste
management. 267 The survey indicated that ninety-eight percent of
survey participants knew what MARPOL 73/78 was, but that only
sixty-eight percent of survey-takers believed that MARPOL 73/78
Annex I regulations were effective at preventing “intentional oil
pollution.” 268 The survey-takers provided recommendations about
how to improve compliance with Annex I of MARPOL 73/78.269
These suggestions include improving on-board training, improving
maritime school training, improving OWS technology so that the
operation of OWS equipment is “less labor intensive” and less
confusing to operate, and digitizing and automating ORB entries. 270
The survey-takers’ suggestions should be implemented. Several
survey-takers reported that they opt to bypass their vessel’s OWSs
and OCMs because they do not know how to properly use and care
for such devices. 271 All crewmembers of vessels subject to the
requirements of MARPOL 73/78 should receive standardized training
and should be taught how to use OWSs and OCMs of many different
makes and models. Engineers should be taught how to repair such
OWSs and OCMs.
Other survey-takers indicated that their vessels’s oil and bilge
water tanks are not large enough to hold all the oil-contaminated
waste produced during long voyages at sea. 272 The number and/or size
of oil holding tanks should be increased so that a vessel’s engineers
and crew are not illegally disposing of oil because oil-holding tanks
267. See Martin Ottaway, Max1 Survey Questions, https://martinottaway.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/full_list_of_max1_survey_questions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WY97573U] (last visited May 5, 2019).
268. Martin Ottaway, Max1 Survey Key Findings (Aug. 21, 2015),
https://martinottaway.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MAX1-SURVEY-KEY-FINDINGSAugust-21-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3V9-W82J].
269. See id.
270. Id. Survey-takers have indicated that ORB records are often made in both gallons
and in metric tons. To avoid confusion, only one of these two units of measurement should be
used within a given vessel’s ORB.
271. See Martin Ottaway, Max1 Survey, Selected Interim Results (May 22, 2015),
https://martinottaway.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/interim_survey_results_22_may_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/644E6P2L].
272. See id.
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are in danger of overflowing. Vessels should also be equipped with
spare parts so that engineers and crewmembers may quickly fix
equipment that is not functioning properly while at sea.
Shipmasters, engineers, and crewmembers must also be
disincentivized from using magic pipes for the purpose of illegally
disposing of oil-contaminated wastewater. Furthermore, shipmasters,
engineers, and crewmembers should be asked to pledge in writing that
they will abide by MARPOL 73/78’s provisions. 273 A sealing system
should be used for all pipe lines and flanges in OWSs and vessels in
which each pipe line or flange is assigned a unique serial number so
that any tampering would be immediately apparent. 274 Vessels should
be required to carry spare parts for their OCM pumps and valves and
spare filters for their OWSs to ensure that these devices can remain
properly functioning while at sea. 275 Although ships’ owners and
operators may express concerns about the costs associated with
installing such equipment on vessels or with requiring vessels to carry
spare parts, these requirements would surely be less expensive than
the fines imposed on ships’ owners and operators for violating
criminal statutes associating with covering up illegal discharges of oil
into the world’s oceans and seas.
B. Increasing Legal Deterrence of Intentional Oil Releases by Ships
The United States should extend its jurisdiction over unlawful
oil releases by foreign-flagged vessels. If the United States were to
extend its authority to prosecute illegal discharges of oil-contaminated
waste water through the outer boundary of its exclusive economic
zone, the United States would be better able to protect the world’s
marine environment from illegal releases of oil because, unlike
nations issuing flags of convenience, the United States would
prosecute those who illegally discharge oil into international waters if
it had the jurisdiction to do so. If the United States were to extend its
jurisdiction over unlawful discharges of oil by foreign-flagged
vessels, it might encourage other non-flag-of-convenience-issuing
nations to do the same, where possible. Furthermore, MARPOL
73/78’s equipment requirements should be extended to vessels
273. See Kantharia, supra note 110.
274. See id.
275. See id.
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weighing fewer than 400 gross tons and oil tankers weighing fewer
than 150 gross tons so that MARPOL 73/78’s requirements bind an
even larger number of vessels to ensure that oil dumping offenses can
be prosecuted by the United States in as many instances as possible.
UNCLOS limits the imposition of criminal penalties for
violations of MARPOL 73/78 to cases of “willful and serious” acts of
pollution. Although it is not clear whether this limitation is still
applicable in the United States because the United States did not
ratify UNCLOS, the “willful and serious” limitation should be
eliminated entirely, and the fines imposed for such violations should
reflect the quantity of oil that is illegally jettisoned. It is important not
to create a loophole through which ship owners, operators, masters,
engineers, and crewmembers can avoid responsibility for releasing
oil, even in small quantities. The number of ships calling on US ports
is enormous and the harmful effects of oil discharged in the world’s
oceans and seas aggregate. If owners, operators, masters, engineers,
and crewmembers know that they will not be prosecuted for
discharging less than a specified amount of oil into US territorial
waters, a huge quantity of oil could lawfully be jettisoned
cumulatively into the territorial waters of the United States.
Finally, section 2Q1.3 of the US Sentencing Guidelines should
be amended to make it clear that the release of oil outside of the
territorial waters of the United States may be considered for purposes
of enhancement during sentencing. The definition of “environmental
offense” for purposes of sentencing enhancements under the US
Sentencing Guidelines should also be broadened to include any
violation of MARPOL 73/78, such as the failure to maintain an
accurate ORB, not just an offense that directly “results” in the illegal
discharge of oil into marine environments. Additionally, the United
States should continue the practice of banning not only individual
ships, but also entire fleets under common ownership from entering
US ports to punish the most egregious repeat offenders of Annex I of
MARPOL 73/78. Ship owners, operators, masters, engineers, and
crewmembers who engage in the deliberate discharge of oil into the
world’s oceans and seas must no longer be able to hide behind flags
of convenience.

